State Banks and Title Insurance:
"Parity" with National Banks Sought


State-chartered banks have caused to be introduced in the Legislature a series of bills which are intended to give such institutions"parity'with national banks. The impetus behind this is the passage by Congress last year of the so-called Financial Services Modernization Act, or Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,. P.L. 106-102. The law was signed by the President on November 12,1999 and became effective on or about March 10, 2000. Among other innovations, the Act permits national banks to enter the insurance field. Under [former) §13 of the National Banking Act [112 U.S.C. §92], only national banks located in a town having a population of 5,000 orfewer persons could sell insurance. Relying on this section and a Supreme Court decision construing it, Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996), the United States District Court compelled the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance to grant a title insurance producer license to a national bank's title insurance subsidiary. Valley Nat'l Bank v. La Vecchia, 59 F.Supp. 2d 432 (U.S.Dist Ct., D.N.J. 1999). For more information, see "Title Talk" No. 44 (Summer, 1999), p. 1.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, of course, applies only to national banks. However, state-chartered banks are concerned that they will be unable to compete with national banks, now that they have been given additional powers that the statechartered institutions lack. For example, Gramm-Leach-Bliley has done away with the 5,000- person restriction found in the 12 U.S.C. §92 and replaced it with much broader wording. In New Jersey a package of three bills, aimed at giving state banks .'parity"with national banks, was introduced in the Assembly: A-2263, A-2264 and A-2265. These bills sought to amend or repeal various banking and insurance statutes wbich restricted the activities of state-chartered banks. Thefirst two bills passed the Assembly without much fanfare. The last one, however, A2265, sought to repeal the first sentence of the §30.1 [formerly §30(g)] of the Title Insurance Act, NJSA 17:4613-30.11, which reads: "No bank, trust company, bank and trust company or other lending institution, mortgage service, mortgage brokerage or mortgage guaranty company or any service company of or for any lending institution or any officer or employee of any of theforegoing shall be licensed or permitted to act as an insurance producer for a title insurance company."
Relying on this section, the Department of Banking & Insurance ["DOBI"] has refused to issue title insurance producer licenses under the Insurance Producer Licensing Act, NJSA 17:22A-1 et seq., to lender-controlled title agencies. The bill was opposed by the New Jersey Land Title Association ["NJLTA"] and by the New Jersey State Bar Association
ONJSBA"] on the grounds that allowing lenders to control title agencies would create conflicts of interest which would have a negative impact on consumers. Furthermore, by simply repealing the quoted language, other lending institutions, such as mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers, would be able to control title agencies. This goes beyond the concept of "parity" between state- and national- chartered banks.
Eventually the Assembly Banking and Insurance Committee approved a revised version of A-2265, which states:
"Except for a State or federally chartered bank, savings bank, savings and loan association or its subsidiary or any officer or employee of any of the foregoing, no other lending institution, mortgage service, mortgage brokerage or mortgage guaranty company or service company or any person licensed pursuant to ... NJSA 17: 11 C- 1 at seq. [the Licensed Lenders Act] shall be licensed as or permitted to act as an insurance producerfora title insurance company.
Thus, only state- or national- chartered banks may become title insurance agents.
Ironically, however, this bill, if enacted, will give the national banks located in New Jersey the abi lity to enter the title insurance field directly and compete with state banks. Why? GrammLeach-Bliley does not grant national banks unlimited power to sell title insurance. Rather, under §303(b) (1) of Gramm-LeachBliley, national banks may (in general) only sell title insurance directly in a state where state-chartered banks are allowed by state law to sell title insurance. By giving themselves the power to sell title insurance directly in New Jersey, state banks are allowing national banks to do so. Thus, if A-2265 is never enacted, neither state banks nor national banks (with one possible exception) will be able to sell title insurance directly in New Jersey. The possible exception is Valley National Bank (discussed above), because §303(c) contains a "grandfather" clause.
On the other hand, most banks will probably not wish to sell title insurance directly. Rather, they will seek to operate or control a title insurance agency. Gramm-Leach-Bliley permits national banks to become involved in the sale of title insurance through a subsidiary. Furthermore, under §303(b) (1), national banks may only sell title insurance "in the same manner, to same extent, and under the same restrictions" that apply to state banks. Since the anti-rebate and controlled business sections of the Title Insurance Act and the Insurance Producer Act will presumably apply to state-chartered banks selling title insurance oust as they apply to all other title insurance agents), national banks should be subject to the same restrictions.
It is also noteworthy that the second sentence of NJSA 17:46B,30.1 (which prohibits a lenderfrom requiring the use of a particular title agency as a condition precedent for granting a mortgage loan) remains intact. This provision should apply to both state and national bank title agencies.

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Narucki Joins Iselin Staff as Agency Counsel

Steven G. Day, Vice President and Northeast Region Manager, is pleased to announce the appointment of Robert J. Narucki as Agency Counsel in Iselin, A native of Nutley, New Jersey, Mr. Narucki was graduated from Notre Dame University with a Bachelor of Arts degree in 1969, and from Wake Forest University School of Law with a Juris Doctor degree in 1972. He was admitted to the bars of the State of New Jersey and the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in 1972, and to the bar of the State of New York in 1982.
After graduating from law school, Narucki served as law cierk to the Hon. F. Michael Caruso, J.S.C., in Essex County and laterjoined the Office of the Public Defender in that county. He was an associate with the Belleville firm of Gaccione & Pomaco (now Gaccione, Pomaco & Beck) in 1975 and 1976. Narucki joined Chicago Title in 1977 as a title officer in the East Orange office. From 1980 to 1990 he acted as manager of the East Brunswick office, having been promoted to Assistant Vice President and later Resident Vice President. Following a stint with a competitor, Narucki returned to Chicago Title as manager of the Union office in 1993, where he served until that branch was consolidated with the Roseland office last year.
Rob lives in Verona with his wife of thirty years, Ellen, a special education pre-school teacher. The couple has three children: Robert, Jr., a 1997 graduate of St. Michael's College in Vermont, Kara, who was graduated from Notre Dame this year; and Ross, an incoming freshman at St. Michael's.. Rob sings in the choir of Our Lady of the Lake R.C. Church and has served as secretary of the Verona Lions Club for the past fifteen years.
Narucki will be located in the State Headquarters office in Iselin. As an attorneywith over 25 years of experience in real estate and title insurance transactions, he will provide invaluable legal and logistical support to the Chicago I Ticor statewide agency network.

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Construction Lien Law
Construed by Supreme Court:
Thomas Group v. Wharton Sr Housing


Although the Construction Lien Law, NJSA 2A:44A-1 at seq., went into effect in April of 1994, our Supreme Court has not had occasion to construe its provisions until recently, in Thomas Group v. Wharton & Housing, 163 N.J. 607 (2000). The following issue was presented: whether a contractor is entitled to file a lien claim for unpaid contractual amounts if the contractor has not fully performed contractual conditions precedent. The court, in a unanimous opinion by written Justice LaVecchia, held that the contractor was entitled to file a lien:
We hold that by dismissing Thomas Group's lien claim as "prematurely filed" the courts below improperly denied Thomas Group the right to a lien establishing its security interest in the property in the amount of the value of the actual work it had performed on the project. 163 N.J. at 510.
Thomas Group entered into a contract on July 28, 1995 to serve as general contractor for a project in Wharton. Thecontract amount was in excess of $5,000,000. OnSeptember3, 1997 it sent the builder an application for final payment in the approximate amount of $755,000, and it simultaneously filed a construction lien claim ["CLC"l for approximately $658,000. In October of 1997 , Thomas Group filed a complaint in Superior Court to foreclose its CLC. The trial court dismissed the complaint and ordered the CLC to be discharged, holding that the CLC was prematurely filed because the work performed did not represent the value of the of the lien. Specifically, the court found that the CLC included a ten per cent retainage amount, which, under the contract, was not to be disbursed until the work was completed. At the time itfiled the CLC, Thomas Group had not submitted the required documentation under the contract which would have enabled the retainage to have been released. Thus, the claimant had not supplied labor or materials " in accordance with the contract", as required by NJSA 2A:44A3, and thus was not eligible to file a CLC. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's determination in an unreported decision.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by summarizing the Construction Lien Law's provisions and comparing them to those found in the Mechanics' Lien Law, NJSA 2A:44-1 at seq., which it had replaced. 163 N.J. at 512 - 514. It noted that 'Injo provisions address the interaction between the statute and contractual retainage clauses", and that there are only a handful of reported decisions construing the statute. Id. at 515. For more information, see "Title Talk" Nos. 26 (Spring, 1994); 35 (Fall, 1996); and 39 (Winter, 1997-98).
According to the Supreme Court, the key to understanding the statute and its application to the fact of the case at bar is to be found in NJSA 2A:44A-3:
Any contractor, subcontractor or supplierwho provides work, services, material or equipment pursuant to a contract, shall be entitled to a lien for the value of the work or services performed, or materials or equipment fumished in accordance with the contiract and based upon the contract price [Emphasis added.]
The decision thus turns on the meaning of the phrase "in accordancewith the contract", which is not defined bythe statute. The court concluded that the phrase
... must be read sensibly and consistent with the law's overall intent to permit contractors to file liens and thus protect the value of the work they have provided. We interpret that language to mean that a party must perform work under a contract to be entitled to a lien, but not to require literally that a party must satisfy all of the terms and conditions of a contract before it can file a lien. 163 N.J. at 517.
In responseto the objection thatthe form of CLC, which is setfbrth in NJSA 2A:44A-8, requires theclaimant to verify that the amount claimed is "due and owing", the court pointed out that the phrase is not defined by the statute. It noted that there are two competing interests, those of the contractor and those of the owner- The court attempted to reconcile these as follows:
We conclude that Thomas Group did not have to risk losing its statutory lien by waiting until all of the contractual preconditions to payment were satisfied before it asserted its lien. ... [The interests of an owner can adequately be protected by staying the contractor's right to enforce its lien unti I the con tractual preconditions for payment are met. ... This accomplishes the legislative purpose of affording lien protection to contractors, while safeguarding the owner's right to insist on strict compliance with contractual terms of payment. 163 N.J. at 520-521.
Thomas Group v. Wharton Sr. Housing provides a good summary of the provisions of the Construction Lien Law. It also attempts to resolve some of the problems resulting from apparent deficiencies in the text of the statute. Whether or not the case was correctly decided, the court's common-sense approach to solving the problems presented by the facts is refreshing.

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Disclaimers and Federal Tax Liens: Drye v. U. S.

In a recent decision, Drye v. U.S., - U.S.-, 120 S. Ct. 474 (1999), the United States Supreme Court held that federal tax liens attached to the interest of a person who disclaimed property inherited by him under Arkansas law. The taxpayer, Rohn Drye, was insolvent and owed the government approximately $325,000 in unpaid taxes, for which notices of federal tax liens had been filed. His mother Irma died intestate in 1994, leaving an estate with a value of about $233,000. Rohn was the sole heirof his mother underArkansas lawand was appointed administrator of her estate. He subsequently resigned and filed a disclaimer with the Probate Court covering all property he would have inherited. The Supreme Court characterized the disclaimer as creating a "... legal fiction that the disclaimant predeceased the decedent" under Arkansas law. The Arkansas disclaimer statute also provides that the creditors of a person disclaiming cannot reach the disclaimed assets. As a result of the disclaimer, the assets of Irma's estate passed to Theresa, Rohn's daughter. Theresa was appointed administratrix and transferred the assets to the Drye Family Trust, the beneficiaries of which are Theresa and her parents.
As noted above, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, held that the disclaimer did not defeat the federal tax liens. The court's reasoningwas based upon the text of 26 U.S.C. §6321, which states that the lien attaches to "... all property and rights to property..." of the taxpayer [emphasis added]. Since the heir or devisee has the power to decide whether or not to disclaim, the court concluded that this right is sufficient to permit the attachment of the lien. Although the court recognized that, in general, title to property and interests therein is a matter governed by state, rather than federal, law, it viewed the broad language of I.R.C. §6321 as controlling in this case. Put another way, state law permitted the disclaimer, but federal law permitted the attachment of the lien to the taxpayer's interest in the disclaimed property.
What effect, if any, does the holding in Drye have upon New Jersey practice? Our statutes recognize both testamentary and inter vivos disclaimers. See NJSA 3B:9-1 et seq. and 46:2E-1 et seq., respectively. These statutes provide that the person disclaiming is deemed to have predeceased the "transferor", and title passes by operation of law to others, such as the [other] heirs or devisees; of the of the decedent, etc. Thus, title companies have traditionally waived as objections to title liens entered against the person disclaiming on the grounds that title never vested in him or her, so there was no real estate interest to which the liens could attach. Of course, as a result of Drye, it will no longer be possible to waive federal tax liens on this basis.
Can the rationale of Dryebe generally applied toother liens, such as Superior Court judg- ments? As the decision turns on the broad wording of a section of the Internal Revenue Code, the answer appears to be "no". The state statutes regarding Superior Courtjudgment liens (for example) do not contain the same language. See N.J.S.A. ZA:16-1; 2A:17-17. On the other hand, a disclaimer may be treated as a fraudulent transfer It is likely that the Supreme Court in Dtye believed that the disclaimer was being employed as vehicle to hinder, delay or defraud creditors (including the Internal Revenue Service). Transfers made for th is purpose are subject to attack under the New Jersey Fraudulent Conveyances Act [NJFCA] , N.J.S.A. 26:2-1 et seq. and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act [UFTA1 , INA.S.A. 25:2-20 et seq. In fact, the statutes auth()-rizing testamentary and inter vivos disclaimers address this issue. See NJSA 3B:9-9(d) and 46:2E- 9, respectively. Thus ' it is necessary for title insurers to consider the effect of the NJFCA or UFTA whenever a disclaimer is utilized

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Construction Loan Endorsement Revised

The New Jersey Land Title Insurance Rating Bureau ["NJLTIRB") has received the approval of the Commissioner of Banking & Insurancefor a revision to the Special Construction Loan Policy Endorsement, effective August 7,2000. The text of the form has been amended to add a sentence which clarifies that all claims under a construction loan policy must be presented during the three (3) year life of the policy. Under Rate Manual §4.5 the charge for a policy insuring a construction loan is reduced to $1.00 per $1,000 of liability assumed. However, a policy for which the reduced rate is paid is a term policy, which expires in three (3) years. It is contemplated that a permanent loan will be secured at or before the end of the three (3) year period. A credit is given at that time for the amount paid for the construction loan policy towards the premium due for the permanent loan policy. Of course, if the standard premium rate is paid, the coverage does not expire in three (3) years, even though the mortgage secures a construction loan.

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Veterans"Tax Deduction Increased

The Legislature has enacted P.L. 2000, c. 9, which amends N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.11 to increase theveterans'prop~ arty tax deduction. Under the law, the former yearly deduction of $50.00 has been increased asfollows: $100.00 in 2000; $150.00 in 2001; $200.00 in 2002, and $250.00 thereafter. The act was approved on March 30,2000 and takes effect immediately.



'Title Talk" is published periodically by Chicago Title and
Ticor Title Insurance Companies, and is distributed free of
charge to their customers and friends.
Steven 6. Day, Esq., Regional Manager, Publisher
Lawrence J. Fineberg, Esq., State Counsel, Editor
Chicago Title Insurance Company
TicorTitle Insurance Company
111 Wood Avenue South
Iselin (Woodbridge Twp.), New Jersey 08830
(732) 205 - 0055 Fax (732) 205 - 0330

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